Deductio ad absurdum: CEOs donating their own stock to their own family foundations by Yermack, David
Deductio ad absurdum:
CEOs donating their own stock
to their own family foundations
David Yermack
Professor of Finance
NYU Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-160
New York, NY 10012
dyermack@stern.nyu.edu
September 2008
Abstract
I study large charitable stock gifts by Chairmen and CEOs of public companies.  These gifts,
which are not subject to insider trading law, often occur just before sharp declines in their
companies’ share prices.  This timing is more pronounced when executives donate their own
shares to their own family foundations.  Evidence related to reporting delays and seasonal
patterns suggests that some CEOs backdate stock gifts to increase personal income tax benefits. 
CEOs’ family foundations hold donated stock for long periods rather than diversifying,
permitting CEOs to continue voting the shares.
I appreciate helpful comments from Stephen Choi, Henrik Cronqvist, Bjorn Jorgensen, Simon
Lorne, Thomas Noe, Mark Seasholes, Jack Siegel, and seminar participants at Arizona State
University, the University of Arizona, Cornell University, Erasmus University Rotterdam,
Helsinki Swedish School of Economics, INSEAD, New York University, Oxford University, the
University of Pennsylvania, the University of Zurich, and the Gerzensee European Summer
Symposium on Financial Markets.  Part of this research was completed while I was a visiting
professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
1Deductio ad absurdum:
CEOs donating their own stock
to their own family foundations
I Introduction
Successful business executives often have noteworthy second careers as philanthropists. 
Examples have spanned the history of American industry, from John Jacob Astor, Andrew
Carnegie, and John D. Rockefeller through Warren Buffett, Ted Turner, and Bill Gates.  For tax
reasons, modern donors often finance their good works by giving away appreciated shares of
stock.  Under U.S. tax law, charitable gifts of stock allow the donor to obtain a personal income
tax deduction for the market value of the shares, while also nullifying the capital gains tax that
would be due if the shares were sold.
Unlike open market sales, gifts of stock are generally not constrained by U.S. insider
trading law, and company officers can often donate shares of stock to charities at times when
selling the same shares would be prohibited.  This exemption has evolved from a combination of
federal caselaw, prosecutorial indifference, and recent amendments to SEC rules (Sulcoski,
1989).  This paper explores whether executives exploit the insider trading gift loophole to make
well-timed charitable donations of stock in advance of price declines, a strategy that would allow
the donors to use their access to inside information to obtain personal income tax benefits.
2I focus upon Chairmen and CEOs of U.S. public companies who establish private family
foundations and then make large contributions to these foundations out of their personal holdings
of company shares.  Because these donors generally controls the entities on either side of these
transactions, while also having private information about the future prospects of their companies,
one might expect well-timed donations to private family foundations to be relatively easy to
accomplish and document.
 I study a sample of 150 stock gifts worth at least $1 million by public company
Chairmen or CEOs to their own family foundations.  Identifying this sample requires cross-
checking stock gifts reported by executives on SEC Form 4 and Form 5 filings against donations
disclosed by private foundations on annual IRS Form 990-PF filings.  The 150 large gifts in my
sample are made by 89 different executives between mid-2003, when the SEC established
electronic filing requirements for stock transfers, and the end of 2005.  The aggregate value of
the gifts, about $670 million, represents nearly one-quarter of all stock gifts made by all public
company Chairmen and CEOs for charitable purposes during this time period.
Consistent with their exemption from insider trading law, I find a pattern of excellent
timing of Chairmen and CEOs’ large stock gifts to their own family foundations.  On average
these gifts occur at peaks in company stock prices, following run-ups and just before significant
price drops.  The price path of the underlying company stocks forms an inverted V-shape over
two month period centered around the reported gift date, with the stock rising and then falling by
an abnormal 3% and peaking exactly on the reported gift date.  For comparison purposes I look
at stock gifts by Chairmen and CEO to all other recipients besides family foundations.  These
other transfers are also well timed, as they occur at local maximums in company stock prices, but
1 IRS Publication 561, “Determining the Value of Donated Property,” rev. April 2007, p. 2, gives the rules for
identifying the date of a stock contribution in order to value it for tax purposes.  If a stock certificate is delivered
physically to a charity, the date of delivery is the valuation date.  If it is mailed, valuation occurs on the date of mailing. 
Assuming that most CEO-donors follow the modern practice of arranging the stock transfer electronically through a bank
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the typical price decline after these gifts is significantly less pronounced than for gifts to CEOs’
own family foundations.
I explore two explanations for the good timing of CEOs’ family foundation stock gifts. 
One clear possibility is a variation on classical insider trading.  CEOs might use their knowledge
of inside information to donate shares at opportune times in order to increase their personal
income tax benefits.  A variety of tests give some support for the hypothesis that CEOs time their
gifts based on inside information.  For instance, a few CEOs make gifts of stock just before
adverse quarterly earnings announcements, a time at which company “blackout” periods would
almost always prohibit open market sales (Bettis, Coles and Lemmon, 2000).  Other CEOs delay
stock gifts until just after positive quarterly earnings announcements.
A second explanation is that CEOs’ stock gifts might be backdated to local maximum
points in company stock price histories, again in a way that would increase the personal income
tax benefits to the CEO.  Such backdating would require coordination between the foundation’s
trustees (generally the CEO and his family) and the company’s stock transfer department (which
reports, at least indirectly, to the CEO).  This sort of collusion is not difficult to imagine given
the abundant evidence of backdating of executives’ stock compensation that has emerged since
2006 in academic studies (Heron and Lie, 2007) and investigations by the IRS, SEC, and
Department of Justice.  Stock gift backdating, if followed by the filing of a personal tax return
claiming a charitable gift deduction, would likely represent tax fraud in violation of IRS rules
that look to the actual transfer date for determining a stock gift’s value.1
or broker, “the date of the contribution is the date the stock is transferred on the books of the corporation,” according to
the IRS.  This language is somewhat elastic, as it does not appear to require the corporation to record a transfer in a
timely way and may even accommodate retroactive dating of stock transfers.  However, other bodies of law dealing with
fraudulent accounting would likely require company bookkeepers to record stock transfers accurately.
2 Probably the most famous case of a fraudulently backdated charitable gift came to light in the 1974
Congressional investigation of President Richard M. Nixon’s personal income tax returns.  While serving as president,
Nixon donated his vice presidential papers from the Eisenhower administration to the National Archives and claimed that
the gift had occurred in early 1969, entitling him to a $576,000 tax deduction.  Subsequent Congressional testimony by a
federal archivist revealed that the true date of the gift was approximately one year later, after an intervening change in
federal law had made the deduction worthless.  See Patricia Sullivan, “Mary Livingston: Spotted Illegal Nixon Tax
Move,” The Washington Post, March 25, 2007, C1.  Nixon, who denied knowledge of the backdating, was ordered to pay
restitution to the U.S. Treasury.  His tax advisor pleaded guilty to fraud and received a four month jail sentence.  See Eric
Pace, “Edward Morgan, 61, Nixon Aide Convicted in Tax Fraud Case,” The New York Times, August 20, 1999.
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Tests used to infer the backdating of executive stock option awards yield results
consistent with the backdating of CEOs’ family foundation stock gifts.  For instance, I find that
the apparent timing of certain subsamples of family foundation stock gifts improves as a function
of the elapsed time between the purported gift date and the date on which the required stock gift
disclosure is filed by the donor with the SEC.  This associated between reporting lags and
favorable gift timing does not hold for CEOs’ stock gifts to other recipients.  Stock gifts of all
types, including family foundation gifts, are also timed more favorably if they are larger and if
they occur in months other than December, when many tax-driven charitable contributions
ordinarily take place.
These results suggest an odd juxtaposition of motives on the part of corporate executives
who donate stock.  While nominally transferring part of their fortunes to charitable foundations
for civic purposes, many appear simultaneously to exploit gaps in the regulation of insider
trading or even to backdate their donations to increase the value of personal income tax benefits. 
The results loosely parallel a series of older tax fraud cases related to donations of artworks to
museums, in which the recipients were found to have colluded with donors to generate inflated
appraisal values that could be used to claim larger income tax deductions (Speiller, 1980).2
3 Based upon IRS data, in 2004 the U.S. had 31,347 active family foundations with $209 billion in assets. 
These figures were 28% and 6% higher, respectively, than the totals for 2000.  Donors contributed $9 billion to family
foundations in 2004, while the foundations gave away $12 billion to charity.  See The Foundation Center, “Key Facts on
Family Foundations,” January 2006, available at www.foundationcenter.org.
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Data in the paper also cast a long shadow upon the increasingly popular role of private
family foundations as conduits for charitable contributions by the wealthy (Andreoni, 2006).3 
Family foundations are created when individuals irrevocably set aside assets for eventual
donation to charity and register with the IRS.  The donor obtains the same tax benefits as if the
assets had been transferred immediately to charity, while the foundation trustees retain them,
invest them, exercise their voting rights, and must give them away at an average rate of 5% per
year.  This bundle of immediate tax benefits and continuing control rights appeals to many
donors, especially top executives of public companies who usually hold large amounts of
appreciated equity in their own firms.  Most family foundations in the sample, which are
invariably controlled by the CEO and his family members as trustees, retain their donors’ stock
gifts for long periods rather than diversifying their assets, as would generally be required if
trustees followed the prudent man rule of investment management.
The results of this paper extend the large managerial incentive literatures on stock
compensation, insider trading, and corporate governance, while also illuminating issues related
to income tax compliance (surveyed by Slemrod, 2007), and the economics of philanthropy
(surveyed by Andreoni, 2006).  Little evidence exists about the use of charitable contributions as
a means of tax evasion apart from Slemrod (1989), which analyzes IRS tax audits from 1982. 
The data for that paper and other studies generally comes from large, anonymous samples of tax
returns provided by the IRS, because accurate information about annual income and deductions
can be nearly impossible to obtain directly from panels of individual taxpayers (Slemrod, 2007). 
4 A signal example of such recognition occurred in 2005 when Bill and Melinda Gates were named Time
magazine’s Persons of the Year – an accolade generally reserved for presidents, popes, and other world leaders – for
pledging tens of billions of dollars of Gates’ Microsoft wealth to charitable causes such as better public health in the
underdeveloped world.  Ted Turner has made massive personal donations to the United Nations and used his
corporation’s resources to underwrite events such as the Goodwill Games, reportedly in pursuit of a Nobel Peace Prize
that has yet to be awarded to him.  For reports of Turner’s use of philanthropy to court favorable publicity, see Sallie
Hofmeister, “Turner Takes Lead in His New Race of Giving,” Los Angeles Times, September 20, 1997, A1; Stephen
Glass, “Gift of the Magnate,” The New Republic, January 26, 1998, 20 (“The most plausible explanation, however, has
more to do with glory than money: Turner wants to win a Nobel Peace Prize.”); Christopher Caldwell, “U. N.
Believable,” The Weekly Standard, October 6, 1997, 12 (“Sources close to Turner's thinking say he hopes to win the
Nobel Peace Prize and has actively sought for years to drum up a nomination.”).
5 See Monica Langley, “Even CEOs Sweat Out Carnegie Hall Tryouts, For the Board, That Is -- Once In, It’s a
Schmooze-Fest for Megadeal-Makers,” The Wall Street Journal, July 30, 1998, A1. (“Since taking over as chairman in
1991, [Sanford] Weill . . . saw director slots as a way to flatter financial heavyweights and then tap into their personal and
corporate bank accounts. . . The chance to rub elbows with fellow titans, and launch a few deals between arpeggios, is
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In contrast, this study uses a dataset developed from public sources in which the identity of each
individual is transparent, allowing for a range of tests not possible in earlier studies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the regulatory
framework for insiders’ stock gifts in the areas of disclosure, income taxation, and insider
trading.  Section III reviews the sample selection for this study.  Section IV analyzes the
structure of CEOs’ family foundations and the stock returns subsequent to their receipt of major
stock gifts from donor CEOs.  Section V concludes.
II Gifts of stock by company executives
In giving away part of their wealth, executives respond to a wide range of motives
(Auten, Clotfelter, and Schmalbeck, 2000).  In addition to the psychic value of altruism, some
donors seek public recognition both for themselves (Harbaugh, 1988) and their companies.4 
Other donors use charitable contributions to achieve membership in elite social circles such as
prestigious non-profit boards, which may provide not only public visibility but also access to
lucrative business relationships.5  More prosaically, philanthropic decisions also depend upon
just one of the features that makes a seat on the Carnegie board one of the hottest in the country.”)
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income tax incentives, estate planning considerations, disclosure requirements, and even aspects
of corporate voting and control.
While finance research has closely studied how CEOs dispose of stock via sale (insider
trading), exchange (mergers and acquisitions), and intergenerational bequest (family business
groups), our knowledge about CEOs’ stock gifts is limited to two recent working papers by
Johnson and Moorman (2005) and Jung and Park (2007).  Johnson and Moorman (2005) study a
large sample of stock gifts by CEOs of U.S. companies between 1989 and 2003.  Consistent with
the results below, the authors find evidence of opportunistic gift timing near local stock price
maximum points, suggesting that donor CEOs use private information to increase personal
income tax benefits.  They do not, however, identify the recipients of individual gifts, study the
role of family foundations, or consider the hypothesis that some gifts might be fraudulently
backdated.  Jung and Park (2007) study transfers of stock by controlling shareholders of South
Korean companies to other family members.  In Korea such transfers create gift tax liability
based upon the average value of the shares over a certain time interval around the gift.  The
paper’s results suggest that companies depress their stock prices around the dates of these
transfers by disclosing bad news and withholding good news from the market in order to reduce
the donor CEOs’ gift taxes.
A. SEC reporting requirements for stock gifts
Corporate officers, directors, and 10% shareholders must publicly report all acquisitions
and dispositions of stock, including gifts.  Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act became effective in
6 These calculations require merging records from Thomson Financial with CRSP data for the closing stock
prices of each company on each gift date.  Throughout this paper I use the closing stock price on the gift date as a
measure of each gift’s value at the time of donation, although for tax purposes the IRS requires use of the average of the
intra-day high and low prices.
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August 2002, the SEC has required disclosures of open market sales and purchases on Form 4
within two business days.  Older, more lenient disclosure rules continue to apply to “bona fide
gifts” of stock, however.  Gifts may be reported by insiders on Form 5 instead of Form 4, and the
filing deadline occurs 45 days after the end of the company’s fiscal year.  I find that about 46%
of the insiders making gifts in my sample choose voluntarily to comply with the practice for
reporting open market sales, as they disclose their gifts to the SEC no more than two trading
days after the transfer date (often these prompt gift disclosures are paired with other filings by
the same insider, such as a simultaneous open market sale).  The remaining 54% of donors take
longer to disclose their gifts, some of them filing more than one year after the transfer date.  The
mean filing delay for gifts in the overall sample is 46 trading days (standard deviation 118 days),
while the median is 4 trading days.  Since June 30, 2003, the SEC has required all Form 4 and
Form 5 filings to be made electronically, and these records are available for public retrieval on
the SEC’s EDGAR database.  Prior to mid 2003 the majority of Form 4 and Form 5 filings were
made in hard copy.
Basic aggregate data about executives’ stock gifts can be obtained from the Thomson
Financial insider trading database, which compiles Form 4 and Form 5 SEC filings by individual
company insiders.  Data for 2006 from the Thomson database indicate that gifts represent a
major category of equity dispositions; during 2006 CEOs sold approximately $16.5 billion worth
of shares on the open market, sold another $12.1 billion back to their companies, made gifts of
about $8.8 billion, and disposed of roughly $6.8 billion of shares through other means.6  As
Aggregates from the Thomson database should not be considered comprehensive or authoritative, because the
database contains a certain number of duplicate, erroneous, or incomplete records, and occasionally transactions that
appear in other sources are omitted from the Thomson database entirely.  Often these problems arise due to idiosyncracies
of SEC reporting requirements or incomplete compliance by executives (some CEOs, for instance, list their title only as
“chairman” or merely “director”; others leave required fields blank). Some filings are made by executives as late as
several years after the legal reporting deadline, meaning that the totals listed above will likely increase in the future. 
CEOs who sell shares back to their firms often do so to pay the exercise prices or income tax withholding associated with
stock options.  The “other” category of CEO dispositions is dominated by share exchanges in mergers.  The data are
extremely skewed, and aggregates in each category can vary materially from year to year; for instance, 60% of the 2006
gifts are accounted for by just three CEO donors: Sheldon Adelson ($2.0 billion), Warren Buffett ($1.9 billion), and
Herbert & Marion Sandler ($1.3 billion).  Similar outlier observations occur periodically in the other categories.
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discussed further below, much of the aggregate reported total of stock gifts are not necessarily
charitable contributions, but rather transfers to family trust funds, limited partnerships, or other
entities for the benefit of an insider or his relatives.
B. Income tax benefits of stock gifts
Personal income tax regulations offer two attractive benefits to donors who make
charitable gifts of stock.  The fair market value of the gift is deductible from the donor’s taxable
income, indirectly reducing his overall tax owed.  In addition, the donor escapes the capital gains
tax that he would otherwise owe on the appreciation of the stock above the price he originally
paid to acquire it; this tax would have eventually been paid if the donor had sold the shares
instead of donating them.
The value of these tax benefits depends upon the financial circumstances of each donor. 
It is all but impossible to ascertain the original cost basis of the shares donated by a corporate
insider, so the value of the insider’s exemption from capital gains tax may be anywhere from
zero to 15% of the value of the gift, since 15% is the long-term marginal capital gains tax rate
today for most individuals.  For the charitable contribution deduction, generally a donor receives
7 A number of qualifications apply.  For instance, for gifts of appreciated stock no donor may take charitable
donation deductions in excess of 20% of their Adjusted Gross Income in any one year, although excess unrealized
deductions may be carried forward and used to shelter income in future years.  Certain phase-outs can also apply to
charitable contribution deductions, though these are capped at a percentage of income and probably do not apply at the
margin for high-income donors; these phase-outs are being repealed in stages between 2006 and 2010.  See Auten et al.
(2000) for a more complete discussion.
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a tax benefit equal to the value of the gift times the marginal personal income tax rate.7  Most
CEO-donors are probably subject to the top bracket of the Alternative Minimum Tax, meaning
that their marginal tax rate is 28% plus any charitable deduction available from state personal
income taxes.  For example, a donor subject to New York state income tax plus the federal AMT
would recognize tax benefits equal to about one-third of the face value of a charitable stock
donation, plus the benefit of permanently avoiding the capital gains tax on the donated shares.
C. Stock gifts and insider trading law
Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, corporate insiders face two broad areas
of potential insider trading liability: the short-swing profit prohibition of Section 16(b), and the
anti-fraud prohibition of Rule 10b-5.  Short-swing profit rules bar corporate insiders from
acquiring a security and then disposing of it at a higher price (or vice versa) within any interval
shorter than six months.  Rule 10b-5 prohibits insider trading on the basis of material, non-public
information “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”  For these laws to apply to
stock gifts, a donation would have to be deemed a “sale” of securities.  While a gift might seem
intrinsically different from a sale, the 1934 Act defines “sale” quite broadly: “The terms ‘sale’
and ‘sell’ each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of [securities]” (emphasis
added).
For short-swing profit liability, current law provides an insider trading exemption for
8 SEC Rule 16b-5(a) was amended in 1991 to codify federal caselaw that had previously protected gifts from
short-swing profit liability.  In proposing the amendment the SEC staff wrote, “Bona fide gifts present less likelihood for
opportunities for abuse [compared to open market sales].”  See “Ownership Reports and Trading By Officers, Directors
and Principal Stockholders,” Release Nos. 34-26333; 35-24768; IC-16669,1988 SEC Lexis 2380 (December 2, 1988). 
The short-swing profit gift exemption originated in Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F.Supp 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).  The chief
executive of Universal Pictures Co. was sued by shareholders after receiving company warrants as part of his
compensation and then donating those warrants to charity within six months.  The plaintiff shareholders argued that the
charitable donation represented a “sale,” for which the executive received a “profit” equal to the value of his income tax
deduction.  The court ruled otherwise, stating, “By no stretch of the imagination, however, can a gift to charity or indeed
to anyone else when made in good faith and without pretense or subterfuge, be considered a sale or anything in the nature
of a sale. It is the very antithesis of a sale . . .” 80 F.Supp 387, 391. See also Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F. 2d 140 (2d Cir.,
1949) and Lewis v. Adler, 331 F. Supp. 1258 (S.D.N.Y., 1971).
9 Private parties have the right to file enforcement actions under Rule 10b-5, but insider trading cases are
invariably initiated by the SEC because the counter-party in an open market sale cannot be identified.  In the aftermath of
an adversely timed charitable stock gift, however, one could imagine the charity suing the donor under Rule 10b-5 if the
recipient had relied upon the stock’s fair market value when donated.  Such litigation by a charity would likely have a
chilling effect upon future donations.  If the CEO tipped off the charity to sell the shares immediately after the donation, a
clear-cut case of Rule 10b-5 liability would arise for both parties in connection with the sale (Wang and Steinberg, 2006,
§5:2.8[E]).
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“bona fide gifts.”8  However, no parallel exemption exists for anti-fraud liability.  Therefore, an
executive who makes a charitable gift and realizes a large tax benefit could potentially violate
Rule 10b-5 if the company issues adverse news that drives its stock price lower shortly
afterward.  However, to date nobody appears ever to have been charged by the SEC with a Rule
10b-5 violation for making an untimely gift of stock,9 so the federal courts have not considered
the issue directly.
For charitable gifts of stock to be treated as “sales” that trigger anti-fraud insider trading
liability, case law indicates a three-part test: (1) whether a change of ownership occurs, (2)
whether the donor receives consideration of pecuniary value, and (3) whether such treatment
would be consistent with the remedial purposes of the 1934 Act.  In addition, the donor must act
with scienter, meaning an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud   See Sulcoski (1989, pp. 614
et. seq.).  Of these requirements, the second, that the donor receive valuable consideration, would
seem to be the most problematic in connection with a gift.  However, a line of cases has held that
10 Warren Buffett of Berkshire Hathaway and Maurice Greenberg of American International Group are two
CEOs who consistently identify themselves only as Chairman of the Board.  Other CEOs are erratic in listing their titles,
sometimes identifying themselves as the CEO and sometimes as Chairman, Director, President, or some combination of
these.
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the income tax deductions received by a donor of stock may represent a pecuniary benefit under
the federal securities laws.  If a donor executive had adverse private information and made a gift
of shares before the stock price dropped, the donor could potentially realize a tax deduction
greater in value than the subsequent worth of the stock, an outcome that surely would contravene
the anti-fraud purposes of the 1934 Act.
III Sample description
Table I outlines the sample selection process, which I discuss in detail in this section.
To study stock gifts by top corporate executives, I search the Thomson Financial insider
trading database that is compiled from insiders’ Form 4 and Form 5 SEC filings.  I retrieve all
dispositions by way of gift (trancode=G) made by persons who list one of their job titles
(rolecode) as either Chief Executive Officer or Chairman of the Board.  I include observations
with the Chairman title because many CEOs hold multiple titles in their firms but do not list all
of them on their SEC filings.10  A large number of Chairmen are also former CEOs, and the
shares they donate to charity were often received as part of their CEO compensation.
Because my data collection strategy requires inspecting the original copies of all Form 4
and Form 5 stock gift reports, I include all observations reported since June 30, 2003, the date on
which the SEC began requiring electronic posting of Form 4 and Form 5 on the SEC’s EDGAR
Internet portal.  Prior to this date electronic filings of these documents were sparse, although
about one-fifth of executives appear to have begun filing electronically on a voluntary basis after
11 This merge is not easy, because the Thomson database indexes observations by CUSIPs, some of which are
missing, outdated, or incomplete for certain companies, including some firms that are quite well known and clearly
belong in the sample.  I use a utility from the Wharton Research Data System to map Thomson CUSIPs to CRSP PERM
numbers.  When I cannot obtain a CRSP stock price by this method, I map Thomson observations to CRSP using
company names, requiring a very close concordance between names for a match to be valid.  Ultimately I drop 706
observations for companies that appear on Thomson but not on CRSP; many of these are probably closely held firms
whose CUSIPs are linked to debt rather than equity securities, or small public firms with penny stocks traded in the pink
sheets.  I drop an additional 250 observations representing gifts that occur outside the range of dates over which the stock
has been publicly traded; these are generally donations of pre-IPO or post-delisting shares.
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Sarbanes-Oxley became effective in August 2002 (I do not use these earlier observations
because sample selection bias might apply to them).  Prior to August 2002 almost no Form 4 or
Form 5 filings are posted on EDGAR.  I exclude observations that Thomson designates as
problematic and unable to be “cleansed” due to missing or inconsistent data.  I drop a small
number of gifts involving securities other than common stock, such as preferred stock or
warrants.  I drop all gifts occurring after December 31, 2005, a cutoff necessary so that the SEC
data can be merged with information from another source, private foundations’ IRS Form 990-
PF filings.  These IRS filings appear on two Internet databases maintained by Guidestar.org and
The Foundation Center, but posting occurs with lags so that many foundations’ filings for the
year 2006 are still unavailable.
Most insider gift disclosures report the gift date and number of shares donated but not the
stock’s market price at the time of donation, so the value of each gift is usually not clear from the
Thomson database.  To ascertain each gift’s value I merge records from Thomson with gift date
closing stock prices obtained from CRSP, excluding about 950 observations for which no public
stock prices are available.11  If a gift is made on a weekend or holiday, I value it using the closing
stock price for the previous trading day.  After dropping a small handful of observations with
12 These problem observations are mostly duplicates that result either from the same gift being reported by
multiple persons (such as a husband and wife who each serve as company officers), or the same gift being reported twice
to the SEC due to an amendment of the original filing.  In addition, a few observations are inaccurate due to data entry
errors by Thomson, and two observations are dropped because the associated SEC filing does not appear on EDGAR.
13 About two-thirds of the smaller gifts are for amounts greater than $1,000 but less than $100,000.  Some gifts
are truly small; the CEO of Alcoa donated two shares of stock in one case, while the CEO of Coca Cola donated one
share in another.  The smallest gift reported to the SEC, for one share of a small cap company, had a value of $5.16.
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data problems,12 I have records for 9,611 stock gifts by chairmen and CEOs over the two and a
half year interval studied.  These gifts are associated with transfers of $18.6 billion worth of
common stock.  To keep data collection manageable, I drop gifts worth less than $1 million,
representing 8,598 observations, or 89% of the sample by count but just $1.1 billion in aggregate
value, or 6% of the sample by dollar value.13  I am left with a final sample of 1,013 major gifts
worth $17.5 billion.
To learn more about these gifts, I retrieve from EDGAR the Form 4 or Form 5 associated
with each observation with a value above $1 million.  Executives’ SEC filings sometimes
identify the entity receiving a gift or include footnotes providing further details.  The SEC also
requires each executive to disaggregate his beneficial ownership by reporting shares held by
each legal entity, such as trust funds or limited partnerships, in which he holds a beneficial
interest.  By reading the Form 4 or Form 5 filing for each of the 1,013 gifts, I am able to identify
a large majority (by dollar value) of major CEO stock “gifts” as transfers from the CEO to other
legal entities that he also controls for the benefit of himself or his immediate family.  In these
cases the SEC filing will usually show a decrease in the CEO’s personal direct ownership offset
by an identical increase in the ownership of an entity such as a family trust fund or a limited
partnership, or perhaps a transfer in ownership directly from the CEO to his spouse or a minor
child.  These transactions, which have various motives related to tax and estate planning,
14 In most cases the matching process is unambiguous, since CEOs tend to name their foundations after
themselves and are almost always the foundation’s only donors.  However, certain problems arise in several cases.  Some
foundations’ IRS filings aggregate several stock gifts by a CEO-donor into an annual total and report the date as
“various.”  In these cases I include the SEC data for the gift in the sample unless information in the SEC and IRS filings
is inconsistent.  For about 30% of the observations minor differences exist between the gift date as reported by the
executive to the SEC and the gift receipt date reported by the foundation to the IRS; many of these differences are just
one or two days apart.  Following IRS guidelines for determining the tax deduction associated with a stock gift, I use the
transfer date reported to the SEC in the analysis below.  The paper’s results are virtually identical if the alternate gift date
is used instead, but the SEC transfer date seems to be the more sensible choice because many gifts are filed with the SEC
and disclosed publicly on dates earlier than the receipt dates shown in the foundations’ IRS filings.  I find four instances
of $1 million stock gifts by CEOs to their foundations that appear in IRS filings but not the Thomson database.  I do not
include these extra observations in the sample, but three of these four gifts are exceedingly well timed ahead of stock
price drops, and the paper’s results would strengthen if they were included.
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represent 351 observations and $14.5 billion in dollar value, about 35% of the sample
observations and 82% of the value transferred.
The remaining observations represent 662 cases in which CEOs or Chairmen make stock
gifts to external recipients beyond their own families, transferring approximately $2.9 billion
worth of shares over the two and a half year sample period.  I ascertain which of these gifts go to
family foundations established by the CEO by searching two Internet databases of foundations’
IRS filings maintained by Guidestar.org and The Foundation Center.  I identify about a fourth of
the gifts – 150 observations representing $670 million of stock – as gifts made by CEOs to their
own family foundations.  The matching process involves determining whether a CEO is a trustee
of a private foundation (Guidestar provides a searchable database of foundation trustees and
officers for this purpose), and then retrieving the foundation’s Form 990-PF to see whether it
reports a stock gift from the executive that matches the date and number of shares reported on his
Form 4 or Form 5 SEC filing.14  The final sample includes gifts to family foundations established
by some of the most famous executives in American business, including Andrew Grove,
Lawrence Ellison, and Wayne Huizenga, but also a wide range of foundations created by CEOs
of less well known, smaller capitalization firms.
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Table I’s data detailing the sample selection process illustrate two striking facts about
executives’ major gifts of stock.  First, for every dollar’s worth of stock given to a charity or
another external recipient, donors in the aggregate give almost five dollars to their own families,
either directly or more commonly through trust funds or other devices.  Dynastic impulses
therefore appear to overwhelm philanthropic ones when most CEOs dispose of their shares. 
Second, when executives choose to make charitable donations, family foundations under their
personal control receive a significant share of the largess, approximately one quarter of all
external stock donations.
Figure 1 shows the seasonal pattern of CEOs’ stock donations in all categories, displayed
for each month between July 2003 and December 2005.  A profound end-of-year clustering
occurs, with December being by far the most popular month for stock gifts and November being
the second most common (the pattern applies to all three subsamples of stock gifts identified
above).  This December clustering accords with the behavior of many taxpayers who make tax
deductible charitable contributions at year-end once their entire year’s tax liability becomes
clear.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative net-of-market stock returns surrounding the dates of
CEOs’ stock gifts, for a period extending approximately six months (120 trading days) prior to
the gift until six months after.  Because some CEOs make multiple gifts on the same day, I use
one observation per company-day, resulting in a sample of 903 observations used in the graph;
the deleted observations include 15 for firms with IPOs within the six-month window prior to the
gift date.  Net-of-market returns for each observation equal the difference between each stock’s
raw daily return and the return on the CRSP equal-weighted market index.  For comparison
15 It is difficult to identify a comparison sample of other legal insider stock dispositions that are informed by
inside information and not constrained by anti-fraud regulations.  One study on point is Gompers and Lerner (1998), who
study distributions of shares in public companies by venture capital funds to their limited partners.  That paper finds
patterns of returns around the distribution date quite similar to those in my Figures 1 and 3 (see Gompers and Lerner’s
Figure 1 on page 2174 of their study).
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purposes, I also show cumulative net-of-market returns for the excluded sample of smaller gifts.
Figure 2 exhibits several clear patterns, closely resembling those found by Johnson and
Moorman (2005) in their study of stock gifts during an earlier sample period of 1989-2003. 
CEOs tend to give away shares following run-ups in their companies’ stock prices, and the gift
date itself on average represents a turning point in the stock’s trajectory, with company prices
moving lower in the months after a gift is made.  This reversal is more dramatic for larger gifts
than for smaller ones, though both tend to occur after stock price run-ups.  The steepness of the
inverted V-shape is sensitive to the method used for calculating abnormal stock returns; if
market model or Fama-French expected returns are used in place of the unadjusted market index,
the pattern becomes more pronounced, while the descent of stock prices after the gift date is less
dramatic (and not significantly different from zero) if the value-weighted CRSP market return is
used in place of the equal-weighted market return.  For all methodologies, the post-gift stock
price decline over the first four weeks is greater for larger gifts compared to smaller ones at
conventional significance levels.15
IV Analysis of stock gifts to private family foundations
A. Description of family foundations in the sample
As discussed earlier, family foundations can be easily established by registering with the
16 Many resources on family foundations are available from the Council on Foundations at www.cof.org.  The
IRS posts general guidelines for foundations at www.irs.gov/charities/foundations, while historical Form 990-PF
aggregate data on their growth, assets, and donations can be downloaded at www.irs.gov/taxstats/charitablestats.
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IRS, and their numbers have grown rapidly in recent years.16  The trustees of a family foundation
– generally the donor, his spouse, and perhaps other relatives – manage its assets and exercise
the associated voting rights.  Foundations must operate within certain limits or face IRS excise
taxes.  For instance, penalties arise if a foundation does not give away 5% of its assets annually
(measured using a five-year moving average formula) to other charitable organizations, or if it
holds 20% or greater voting control in any business corporation.
The 150 large stock gifts identified in the sample are made by 89 individual CEOs over
the 30-month sample period.  Table II presents descriptive statistics about these executives and
their foundations.  The table includes data from the IRS Form 990-PF filed in the most recent
year that a foundation received a major stock gift from each executive, so the table is based upon
89 observations, one per individual Chairman or CEO.
The median foundation in the sample is seven years old at the time of its most recent
major donation and holds a median of $5.2 million in total assets.  Maximum values are far
higher, as the oldest foundation was established 42 years ago and the largest holds more than
$189 million in assets.  The median gift size is $2.9 million, with a mean of $5.7 million and
maximum of $52.1 million.  The median foundation gives away 4% of its assets each year, and
the rate of distribution to outside charities is well below the intake of new donations. 
Foundations tend to follow a life cycle in which their early years exhibit a buildup of assets and
relatively low rate of distribution.  The right two columns of the table show medians for two
subsamples: foundations less than five years old, and those aged five or more years.  The median
17 According to IRS Form 990-PF filings, John J. Schiff Jr. of Cincinnati Financial Corp., a man with a fortune
exceeding half a billion dollars, since 2005 has received $30,000 annually from the assets of the John J. & Mary R. Schiff
Foundation for serving as its Chairman, augmenting the $2 million+ annual compensation he receives from his company. 
Identical payments are made to his brother and sister for serving as trustees.  The fee was previously $7,500 per year
before being raised to $12,000 in 2001 and $15,000 in 2003.
18 In an exceptional recent case, the Weill Family Foundation created by former Citigroup Chairman and CEO
Sanford Weill agreed to invest in new equity issued by Citigroup in January 2008, after losses in subprime mortgage
securities threatened the bank’s capital adequacy.  See the company’s press release, “Citi Announces Key Actions to
Enhance Capital Base,” January 15, 2008.  While many foundations receive gifts of shares in their donors’ companies, in
my reviews of hundreds of IRS Form 990-PF filings I found no other record of a foundation ever making a purchase of
such equity, as it would only compound the lack of diversification that most family foundations exhibit.
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ratio of distributions to donations is just 1% for the younger foundations but 24% for the older
cohort.  The median ratios of distributions to total assets are 1% and 5%, respectively.
CEOs who make major stock gifts to family foundations tend to be older and
considerably richer than the general population of CEOs.  The median CEO in the sample is 62
and has $172.8 million of equity invested in his firm (measured as the market value of stock plus
in-the-money value of options), compared to the sample medians of 56 years old and $16.1
million of equity for all CEOs listed on ExecuComp during the 2003-05 period.  A significant
number are company founders who control large blocks of stock in their firms.  The median
CEO in the sample has placed about 4% of his shareholdings in the family foundation.  In a few
cases CEOs or their family members collect small annual fees for their service as foundation
trustees or officers.17
Because of donors’ tax advantages related to avoiding capital gains liability, foundations
in the sample receive most of their contributions in the form of shares in CEOs’ companies,
although some CEOs do contribute cash or other property from time to time.  Data indicate that
these foundations sell the donated shares very slowly.  Foundations hold a median of 58% of
their assets in the donor-CEO’s company’s stock, a fraction that is not meaningfully different in
the subsamples of younger and older foundations (63% vs. 55%).18  A variety of statistics
While most CEOs’ foundations concentrate their holdings in ordinary stocks, bonds, and cash equivalents, a few
hold more exotic investments, including commodities funds (The Thomas and Stacey Siebel Foundation, started by
Thomas Siebel of Siebel Systems Inc.) and emerging market sovereign debt (The Cumming Foundation, started by Ian
Cumming of Leucadia National Corp.).
19 Part of this pattern may be due to CEOs counting their foundations’ shares as part of their personal beneficial
ownership for reporting purposes.  In reading numerous proxy statement ownership reports, I found that CEOs are quite
inconsistent (and not always transparent) in choosing whether to include their private foundations’ holdings as part of
their personal beneficial ownership disclosures that are required in each annual proxy statement.  I did not find clear SEC
guidance on whether such ownership should be included.  One could argue that if a CEO serves as his own private
foundation’s trustee (which is invariably the case), then the foundation’s holdings should count as part of the CEO’s
beneficial ownership.  That argument might be undercut, however, by the fact that the CEO’s donation is irrevocable and
can ultimately benefit only bona fide charitable organizations, and not the CEO personally.
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indicate that a foundation’s tendency to hold the shares of the donor CEO’s firm increases with
the size of the CEO’s personal ownership in the company.  For instance, seven CEOs in the
sample have ownership stakes exceeding one billion dollars, and their foundations’ allocation of
assets to their respectve companies’ stock are 99%, 98%, 98%, 83%, 65%, and 49%, with one
missing value.  The overall sample correlation between the dollar value of a CEO’s ownership
and the percentage of his foundation’s holdings in the company’s shares is +0.17.19
The high concentration of CEOs’ private foundation assets in their donors’ own company
stocks seems to contradict modern investment teaching about the importance of diversification as
a means of risk reduction.  Diversification of charitable endowment funds is required under most
circumstances by the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, the model code
enacted by numerous U.S. states as the legal standard for charitable trustees’ investment policies. 
Section 3 of the Act states that “A [charitable] institution shall diversify the investments of an
institutional fund unless the institution reasonably determines that, because of special
circumstances, the purposes of the institution are better served without diversification.” 
Commentary accompanying the Act goes on to state that “A decision not to diversify must be
20 Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (2006), approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, July 7-14, 2006, as successor to the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds
Act (1972).  The UPMIFA has been enacted in 14 states so far and is under legislative consideration in approximately 20
others.  See www.nccusl.org.  Whether a private foundation should sell the shares of a donor who contributes his own
company’s stock is discussed in Luis M. Viceira and Helen H. Tung, “Investment Policy at the Hewlett Foundation
(2005),” Harvard Business School case 9-205-126.
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made based on the needs of the charity and not solely for the benefit of a donor.”20
B. Timing of major stock gifts to family foundations
Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of company stock prices around the dates that their
Chairmen or CEOs make stock gifts of at least $1 million.  The graph shows two lines: a red
series for 150 observations of gifts to the executives’ family foundations, and a blue series for
742 observations of gifts to all other recipients (a handful of observations are excluded for firms
with IPOs within the six months prior to the gift date).  Apart from gifts to family foundations,
no meaningful difference exists in the return patterns around intra-family gifts and gifts to other
external recipients, so these categories are consolidated in the blue series for clarity of display. 
Cumulative returns are shown on a net-of-market basis with the CRSP equal weighted market
index subtracted from the raw stock return.
A comparison of the two series in Figure 3 shows several patterns.  Stock donations
occur after run-ups of close to 5% over the six months prior to the recorded gift date; these run-
ups are nearly identical across the two subsamples and accelerate in the weeks immediately
before the reported gift date.  After this date, both series exhibit negative returns, but the decline
is far steeper in the red series of gifts to family foundations.  After six months the red and blue
series converge to approximately the same cumulative post-gift return.  The difference between
the two series, then, rests in the much steeper drop that occurs in the first several weeks after the
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family foundation gifts.  After 20 trading days the difference between the two series equals about
2.2 percentage points, significant below the 1% level, but after 60 trading days the difference
narrows enough so that it is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels.
Table III presents greater detail about the cumulative abnormal returns following CEOs’
stock gifts to family foundations.  The table presents five-day and 20-day CARs calculated eight
different ways as a check on the robustness of the paper’s results.  The table indicates that these
firms underperform the market by about 1% within the first week after a large CEO stock
donation to a family foundation, and by 2% to 3%, depending on the method used, within four
weeks or 20 trading days.  The magnitude of these price declines is far larger than typical stock
price movements after insiders’ dispositions through open market sales.  Brochet (2008), in a
recent comprehensive study of thousands of top managers’ sales during a similar time period,
finds five-day abnormal stock price declines of -0.19% (mean) and -0.26% (median) after CEO
stock sales, with little further movement after this initial drop.  A related study by Jeng, Metrick
and Zeckhauser (2003) finds no evidence of abnormal stock price declines after insider sales.
The stock price declines I find after family foundation gifts do not appear to be due to
news of the gifts themselves.  Many gifts are not disclosed via SEC filings for weeks or even
months after the actual gift date.  An event study using the filing date as the event date obtains a
negative two-day CAR of about -0.5%, significant at the 5% level.  However, this abnormal
return is much lower in magnitude than the drops reported in Figure 3 and Table III, and it is
likely due in part to other negative news about the firm that the donor may know before selecting
the gift date.  Interestingly, filings with longer delays lead to more negative market reactions
when disclosed; for the subsample of family foundation gifts reported to the SEC 20 or more
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days after the gift date (about one-third of the sample), the two-day CAR is about -1.0%,
significant at the 5% level.  These negative market reactions are consistent with shareholders
inferring that a CEO who chooses to donate shares likely holds adverse, non-public news about
his firm.
How large are the potential financial gains to managers who strategically time their
charitable gifts?  Data in Figure 3 and Table III indicate that stock prices drop close to 3% soon
after CEOs make stock gifts to their family foundations.  The tax benefits to a typical CEO from
capital gains avoidance plus charitable deductions are probably about one-third of the market
value of donated stock, meaning that on average, the CEO’s tax savings equal approximately 1%
of the market value of such a stock gift.  For the median gift of about $3 million reported in
Table II, this tax savings would imply a gain to the donor CEO of about $30,000.
However, not all CEOs strategically time their charitable stock gifts.  Data in Table III
suggest that company stock prices rise faster than the market following about 40% of CEO stock
donations to family foundations and fall after about 60%.  If no strategic timing of gifts occurred,
this distribution should be symmetric, with the number of stocks outperforming the market equal
to the number underperforming.  This implies that about one in five major stock gifts to family
foundations are strategically timed (the difference between 60% and 40%).  If the average 3%
stock decline following all charitable stock gifts is attributed solely to the one-fifth of donations
that may be opportunistically timed, then the average decline for these stocks would be about
15%, net of market.  The tax savings to the donor CEOs of these gifts would be one-third of this
amount, equal to 5% of the gift’s face value, worth $150,000 for the median gift.  Given the
absence (or perhaps non-existence) or legal consequences for manipulating charitable gift dates,
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it may not be surprising to see a minority of CEO donors taking these actions to obtain six-figure
personal tax savings.
 
C. Why are CEOs’ stock gifts followed by negative abnormal returns?
When insiders’ stock transactions are followed by unusual movements in their stocks’
prices, research has traditionally attributed the pattern to exploitation of inside information.  For
stock gifts followed by a share price drops, one would conjecture that managers were aware of
impending bad news to be released by their firms and accelerated their donations in order to
obtain larger personal income tax deductions.  An alternative explanation, suggested by recent
research into the timing of executive stock option awards, is that charitable gifts may be
documented retroactively, with the gift dates backdated by the companies and recipient charities
so that donor-executives may increase their tax deductions.  The post-gift date stock price
declines shown in Figure 3 and Table III are consistent with either explanation, so I conduct
further tests to try to distinguish between them.
The first research into executive stock option award timing by Yermack (1997) looked
closely at the coordination of option awards and quarterly earnings announcements by
companies.  Earnings announcements are excellent news disclosures to examine, because their
nearly universal schedule (all but a few firms announce earnings every three months) renders
them free of sample selection bias, and because earnings news is almost always considered
material information by investors.  Yermack (1997) found that executive stock option awards are
far more likely to occur before favorable earnings announcements and after negative
announcements rather than vice-versa.  These patterns later acquired the labels “springloading”
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and “bullet dodging” in the popular jargon of option timing.
Figure IV shows the distribution of Chairmen and CEOs’ major stock gifts relative to the
dates of quarterly earnings announcements with data aggregated on a weekly basis.  Data are
sorted into three groups, for intra-family transfers, gifts to family foundations, and gifts to all
other outside sources.  The intra-family transfers, which do not have tax consequences related to
their dates, appear to be timed uniformly across different weeks with no regard for the schedule
of earnings announcements.  The latter two groups, each of which will usually trigger income tax
deductions, appear to take close account of the earnings calendar.  Far fewer stock gifts than
usual occur just before earnings releases, and an unusually large number occur just afterwards.
This distribution of gift dates suggests that, even though insider trading laws do not apply
to gifts, CEO donors may comply voluntarily with these laws and not make stock gifts when they
would be unable to sell shares.  Company compliance policies on stock gifts might also parallel
those for open market sales and forbid gifts just before earnings releases (Bettis, Coles, and
Lemmon, 2000).  However, a closer look at the stock gifts just before and just after earnings
announcements undermines this hypothesis, as shown by data in Table IV.  Among the 150
major stock gifts to family foundations, five occur in the one-week period immediately
preceding an earnings announcement, while 18 occur in the one-week period beginning on the
earnings date and continuing for four additional trading days.  Without manipulation of gift
dates, one would not expect any difference in the earnings announcements that occur either
immediately before or immediately after gifts.  I look at the two-day raw stock price movements
on the earnings announcement day and subsequent day, since only the raw price affects the
donor’s tax benefits.  Among the five donations for which an earnings announcement is closely
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preceded by a stock gift, four companies’ prices drop on the earnings news, with a mean loss of -
3.47% (t-statistic 1.95).  Donating just before a stock price drop would be the mirror-image
analogue to the “springloading” of an executive stock option award.  Among the earnings
announcements that take place on the gift date or just before, company stock prices rise in 15 out
of 18 cases, with a mean gain of +5.54% (t-statistic 4.27) – a variant on “bullet dodging.”  The
difference in sample means, 9.01%, is significant well below the 1% level.  These data about
earnings announcements suggest that CEOs do take advance information about earnings releases
into account when choosing the timing of stock gifts to their own family foundations.  It gives no
indication one way or the other about whether these gifts might be backdated.
Evidence for the backdating of executive stock options developed by Lie (2005) and
Heron and Lie (2007) rests upon three empirical patterns: (1) option awards that occur in regular
calendar patterns (“scheduled awards”), such as the same week every year, are not as favorably
timed as those that occur at unexpected times (“unscheduled awards”); (2) the favorable timing
of option awards tends to improve with the amount of time that an executive takes to disclose the
award to the SEC; and (3) awards tend to be timed not only with the firm’s abnormal movement
relative to the market, but also with movements in the underlying market index.  I explore each
of these patterns with respect to CEOs’ family foundation stock gifts, estimating regression
models with the dependent variables equal to the cumulative raw stock return and cumulative
net-of-market stock return, both measured over the 20 days following each stock gift by a CEO.
As shown by Figure 1, a large number of CEOs’ stock gifts occur in December, a pattern
caused by many individuals who wait until year-end to determine their charitable contributions
once they have full knowledge of their annual taxable income (one might also say that many
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people procrastinate until the end of the tax year and donate only when faced with the imminent
postponment of the deduction).  I conjecture that gifts during the other 11 calendar months, the
analogue of unscheduled executive stock option awards, are more likely to be strategically timed
or backdated.  Therefore, I estimate separate regression models for two subsamples of gifts,
those made in December and those in the remaining 11 months.
Explanatory variables in the regressions include dummy variables for gifts to family
foundations and gifts to other non-family recipients, since these gifts generally provide tax
benefits of varying size; the log of the face value of each award; and the number of days elapsed
between the reported gift date and its SEC filing.  To test the backdating hypothesis for various
subsamples of gifts, I include two interaction terms between the reporting lag variable and
indicators for family foundation gifts and other non-family gifts.
Coefficient estimates in Table V provide evidence consistent with the backdating of stock
gifts by CEOs to their own family foundations, at least for gifts made outside the month of
December.  The interaction term between the family foundation indicator variable and the
reporting lag is negative and significant in the left two columns.  This implies that non-
December family foundation gifts tend to be better timed when CEOs take longer to disclose
these gifts in SEC filings; a longer reporting delay gives the reporting executive a longer window
over which to look back and select a favorable purported gift date.  I also find that, holding the
reporting lag constant, family foundation gifts are better timed than other stock gifts, and larger
gifts are better timed than smaller gifts, for the 11-month non-December subsample.  For gifts
made in December, none of the regressor variables has a significant coefficient estimate,
implying donors engage in little or no backdating or exploitation of inside information when
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making gifts near the end of the year.
I re-estimate the models in Table V using the market index return as the dependent
variable (the output is equivalent to the difference of the estimates in columns one minus two
and three minus four).  No evidence emerges of coordination between the timing of gifts and
movements in the overall market.  The absence of significant estimates for these variables means
that the evidence for backdating of CEOs’ gifts to family foundations is not as comprehensive as
the evidence for backdating of executive stock option awards.
V Discussion and conclusions
This paper studies large gifts of stock by Chairmen and CEOs of public companies to
their own private family foundations.  I find that CEOs make these charitable stock gifts just
before sharp drops in their share prices, a pattern that increases the value of their personal
income tax deductions arising from the gifts.  I explore circumstantial evidence of whether the
favorable timing of CEOs’ stock gifts occurs because of access to inside information or
retroactive backdating.  Some tests support both of these explanations.  Together these results
illuminate a surprising mix of motives by corporate executives who make large charitable
contributions: while seeking to subsidize good works in society, they simultaneously follow
aggressive tax evasion strategies.
The results of this study have implications for several issues at the intersection of
securities regulation, tax policy, and the economics of philanthropy.  One might see the data
presented above as justification for the SEC and the federal courts to reconsider their
indifference to whether stock gifts should be regulated similarly to open market stock sales, with
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prompt disclosure, blackout periods, and application of the “disclose or abstain” doctrine to
prevent the abuse of inside information by corporate executives.  The results of this paper
indicate that two groups may be systematically harmed by opportunistically timed stock gifts:
taxpayers and charities, and the government has a longstanding interest in protecting each of
these large constituencies.  However, one might wonder whether CEOs would donate as much if
insider trading laws were enforced to curb strategic gift timing.  A lengthy literature has
estimated the role of tax subsidies in encouraging charitable giving (Feldstein and Taylor, 1976;
O’Neil, Steinberg and Thompson, 1996).  These studies generally conclude that donations to
charity rise when the availability of valuable tax deductions increases, especially for wealthy
taxpayers.  The ability to time stock gifts strategically can be viewed as a type of tax subsidy. 
Tax and securities regulators authorities may be aware of donors’ propensity to choose
opportunistic dates on which to give appreciated stock to charity, but they may tolerate this
behavior if it creates social benefits through higher charitable giving.
Data about private family foundations suggest reasons for the IRS to scrutinize their asset
holdings and rates of giving.  Most foundations in my sample diversify very little and donate
their assets to outside charities at modest rates.  In some cases the immediate tax benefits to a
donor CEO who contributes appreciated stock may easily exceed the discounted present value of
charitable donations made by the foundation over time.  One consultant to non-profit firms told
The Wall Street Journal in 1997 that, “For rich people who've made a killing in the stock market
lately, the ultimate status symbol is creating a foundation with your name on it,” adding, “The
majority of these so-called charitable foundations [are] motivated more for avoiding taxes and
21 Monica Langley, “All in the Family: A Tax Break Prompts Millionaires’ Mad Dash to Create Foundations,”
The Wall Street Journal, January 27, 1997, A1.
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supporting pet projects than helping society.”21
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Table I
Sample description
The table describes the process of identifying a sample of major stock gifts by Chairmen and
CEOs of public companies.  Candidate observations are extracted from the Thomson Financial
insider trading database compiled from executives’ Form 4 and Form 5 SEC stock transfer
filings made between June 30, 2003, and December 31, 2005.  Daily closing stock price data
from CRSP is used to determine the value of each gift.  For gifts worth $1 million or more,
recipients are identified when possible by reading the original Form 4 and Form 5 documents
posted on the SEC’s EDGAR website, and by reading IRS Form 990-PF filings by CEOs’
private family foundations posted on websites maintained by Guidestar.org and The Foundation
Center.
Obs. Dollar value Mean gift
Total gifts listed on database 10,567 $18.48 billion $1.7 million
  Executives’ companies not listed on CRSP
  Gifts during pre-IPO or post-delisting periods
  Less than $1 million value
(706)
(250)
(8,598)
n.a.
n.a.
($1.08 billion)
n.a.
n.a.
$126,000
Sample of large gifts with valid data 1,013 $17.40 billion $17.1 million
Gifts for personal benefit of CEO and family
  To trust funds, limited partnerships, LLCs, etc.
  To relatives directly (non-dependents)
(313)
(38)
($14.21 billion)
($0.26 billion)
$45.4 million
$6.7 million
Gifts to charity and other external recipients
  To private family foundations
  To charitable family trusts
  To unknown recipients
662
150
10
502
$2.93 billion
$0.67 billion
$0.03 billion
$2.43 billion
$4.4 million
$4.5 million
$3.3 million
$4.8 million
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Table II
Descriptive statistics about family foundations receiving large CEO stock gifts
Descriptive statistics about private family foundations established and controlled by Chairmen and CEOs of 89 U.S. public
companies.  The sample includes private foundations that received gifts of $1 million or more of their sponsor’s company stock one or
more times between June 30, 2003 and December 31, 2005; the 89 foundations received a total of 150 such gifts during this period. 
One observation is shown per foundation, with data tabulated in the year of the most recent $1 million stock gift.  Financial data is
transcribed from IRS Form 990-PF filings by each foundation.  The age of each foundation is measured as the difference between the
reporting year and one year prior to the date of its IRS tax exemption ruling, as reported by Guidestar.org.
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Median
for
entire
sample
Median for
foundations
less than five
years old
Median for
foundations
five or more
years old
Age of CEO’s foundation
Total assets of foundation
Annual gifts to foundation
Annual grants by foundation
Grants / gifts
Grants / (assets+grants)
Age of CEO
CEO stock ownership
CEO stock held by foundation
CEO foundation’s assets/
CEO stock ownership
Fraction of CEO foundation’s
assets held in CEO’s stock
89
89
88
89
88
89
89
89
74
89
74
8.1 years
$17.6 mm
$5.7 mm
$2.0 mm
0.31
0.11
61.4 years
$473.6 mm
$9.7 mm
0.14
0.55
7.8
$32.5
$7.6
$6.3
0.51
0.17
9.6
$1,108.9
$23.1
0.44
0.40
0
$0.8
$1.0
$0
0
0
39
$1.7
$0
0.002
0
42
$189.1
$52.1
$52.5
3.86
0.98
85
$8,376.9
$168.1
3.73
1.00
7
$5.2
$2.9
$0.4
0.12
0.04
62
$172.8
$3.0
0.04
0.58
1
$4.3
$2.3
$0.05
0.01
0.01
60
$150.0
$1.4
0.04
0.63
9
$7.4
$3.0
$0.8
0.24
0.05
63
$173.3
$3.4
0.08
0.55
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Table III
Cumulative abnormal stock returns around dates of large CEO stock gifts
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around 150 dates on which the CEO or Chairman of a public company donates at least $1 million of
personally owned company shares to his own private family foundation.  The top half of the table shows CARs calculated for the five-day period
following the reported date of the stock gift, while the bottom half shows CARs calculated over the 20-day period subsequent to the reported gift
date.  CARs are calculated according to eight different methods, and each cell of the table reports the mean CAR, the test statistic for the null
hypothesis that the CAR equals zero, and the percentage of CAR observations that have negative values.  CAR calculations exclude one
observations for a firm that had its IPO shortly prior to the event date.  Market model and Fama-French expected returns use a 252 day parameter
estimation period that stops 252 days before the reported gift date.  Expected returns for matched portfolios are obtained from Kenneth French’s
website.  The sample is based upon executives’ Form 4 and Form 5 stock transfer reports filed with the SEC as reported on the Thomson Financial
insider trading database, cross-checked against Form 990-PF filings with the IRS by each donors’ private family foundations.
Model of
expected returns: Market model
Fama-French
 four factor model Net-of-market
Matched book-to-market
and size decile portfolios
Benchmark
portfolio weighting
Equal
weighted
Value
weighted
Equal
weighted
Value
weighted
Equal
weighted
Value
weighted
Equal
weighted
Value
weighted
CAR [t+1, t+5]
  Mean
  Z or t-statistic
  % negative
-1.18%
-2.35 c
61.1%
-1.12%
-2.63 b
58.4%
-0.96%
-2.34 c
58.4%
-1.06%
-2.64 b
58.4%
-0.91%
-2.51 c
59.1%
-0.62%
-1.43
57.0%
-0.72%
-2.04 b
53.0%
-0.67%
-1.90 c
51.0%
CAR [t+1, t+20]
  Mean
  Z or t-statistic
  % negative
-3.12%
-2.79 b
59.1%
-3.25%
-3.29 a
61.7%
-3.18%
-3.86 a
59.7%
-3.54%
-4.41 a
59.1%
-2.84%
-3.47 a
67.1%
-1.51%
-1.39
57.0%
-2.04%
-3.18 a
59.2%
-1.92%
-3.02 a
59.7%
Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c) levels.
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Table IV
Two-day stock returns following earnings announcements close to major CEO stock gifts
Two-day stock price reactions following company quarterly earnings announcements for
subsamples of announcements that occur close to the dates of major CEO stock gifts to family
foundations.  The first line of the table shows data for gifts that are dated within the five trading
days prior to an earnings announcement.  The second line is based upon gifts made on the
earnings announcement day or the four subsequent days.  Gift dates are obtained from SEC Form
4 and Form 5 stock transfer records by company executives, and earnings announcement dates
are obtained from IBES.
Timing of gift Number
Positive
earnings
returns
Negative
earnings
returns Mean t-statistic
[t-5, t-1] before
announcement
5 1 4 -3.47% -1.95
[t0, t+4] after announcement 18 15 3 5.54% 4.27
Difference 9.01% 4.09
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Table V
Regression model of cumulative returns following large CEO stock gifts
Ordinary least squares estimates for models of cumulative stock returns over the 20 days following gifts
of stock by Chairmen and CEOs of U.S. public companies.  In the first and third columns the dependent
variable equals the raw stock return of the CEO’s company.  The second and fourth columns use the
market adjusted return as the dependent variable, equal to difference between the raw stock return and the
CRSP equal weighted market index.  t-statistics based on robust standard errors appear below each
coefficient estimate.  The sample is identified from SEC Form 4 and Form 5 stock transfer reports
compiled by the Thomson Financial insider trading database.  The reporting lag is the number of market
trading days between the reported gift date and the SEC filing date.  Gifts to family foundations and other
external recipients are identified from the texts of SEC filings by executives and IRS filings by
executives’ private family foundations.  The value of each stock donation is calculated using the CRSP
closing stock price on the reported gift date.  When an executive makes multiple gifts on one day, only
one observation appears in the regression, and the minimum reporting lag is used.
Month of gift: January-November December
Stock return dependent variable: Raw Raw-Market Raw Raw-Market
Intercept
Log (donation value)
x 10-2
Family foundation gift indicator
Other external gift indicator
Reporting lag (days)
x 10-4
Reporting lag x family foundation indicator
x 10-4
Reporting lag x other external gift indicator
x 10-4
0.120 a
(3.60)
-1.095 a
(2.99)
-0.027 b
(2.09)
-0.014
(1.44)
0.082
(0.26)
-2.995 c
(1.77)
-0.459
(0.73)
0.110 a
(3.54)
-1.195 a
(3.58)
-0.030 b
(2.55)
-0.015
(1.62)
-0.098
(0.33)
-2.832 c
(1.93)
-0.279
(0.47)
0.008
(0.19)
-0.079
(0.18)
0.005
(0.38)
0.001
(0.05)
1.507
(0.63)
-0.246
(0.08)
-0.132
(0.05)
-0.073 c
(1.94)
0.383
(0.95)
0.009
(0.66)
0.008
(0.63)
2.703
(1.18)
-1.116
(0.41)
-1.674
(0.67)
Observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistic
612
0.027
3.81 a
612
0.035
4.67 a
265
-0.007
0.68
265
0.013
1.58
Significant at 1% (a), 5% (b), and 10% (c) levels.
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Figure 1
Seasonal pattern of CEOs’ large stock gifts
The figure shows monthly data for the number of stock gifts worth at least $1 million that are
reported to the SEC by Chairmen and CEOs of public companies.  The sample is compiled from
SEC Form 4 and Form 5 filings reported on the Thomson Financial insider trading database
between June 30, 2003, when electronic SEC filing became mandatory, and December 31, 2005.
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Figure 2
Shareholder returns surrounding dates of large stock gifts by top corporate executives
The chart shows cumulative net-of-market stock returns for a sample of companies whose
Chairmen or CEOs make gifts of stock, with the sample partitioned into two series based upon
the face value of the gifts.  The sample is identified from the Thomson Financial insider trading
database and includes 903 unique company-date observations for gifts of $1 million or more, and
5,854 company-date observations for smaller gifts (only one observation is included in the
tabulations when multiple gifts are made by one person on the same day).  Calculations use the
difference between each stock’s raw return and the CRSP equal-weighted market index.
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Figure 3
Shareholder returns surrounding dates of executives’ stock gifts, sorted by recipient
The chart shows cumulative net-of-market stock returns for two samples of companies whose
Chairmen or Chief Executives make gifts of stock worth $1 million or more.  The red series
shows returns for a portfolio of 150 firms whose donors contribute stock to their own private
family foundations.  The blue series shows returns for 742 other firms whose donors contribute
to other types of recipients.  The samples are identified from the Thomson Financial insider
trading database of SEC Form 4 and Form 5 stock transfer filings, and the Guidestar.org and
Foundation Center databases of IRS Form 990-PF foundation filings.  Only one observation per
firm is included on days that a CEO makes multiple gifts.  Return calculations use the difference
between each stock’s raw return and the CRSP equal-weighted market index.
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Figure 4
Timing of executives’ major stock gifts, relative to quarterly earnings announcements
The chart shows the distribution of the timing of gifts of stock worth $1 million or more by
Chairmen and CEOs of U.S. public companies between mid-2003 and the end of 2005.  Gift
dates are tabulated weekly relative to the dates of quarterly earnings announcements by the
executives’ firms.  Gifts are shown in three categories, depending upon whether the recipient is a
trust fund or similar entity for the benefit of the CEO or his family (the blue series), a private
family foundation established by the CEO (the red series), or any other external recipient (the
green series).  The samples are identified from the Thomson Financial insider trading database of
SEC Form 4 and Form 5 stock transfer filings, and the Guidestar.org and Foundation Center
databases of IRS Form 990-PF foundation filings.  Only one observation per firm is included on
days that a CEO makes multiple gifts.  Dates of quarterly earnings announcements are obtained
from IBES, augmented by information from public news reports.
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